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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate in 2017 about the adoption of destination-based cash
flow taxation (DBCFT), centered in the United States but drawing
commentators from across the globe, has been eye-opening in many
ways.  Both economists and legal scholars have had to apply their ana-
lytical tools to evaluate a largely unprecedented tax policy instru-
ment.1  Seemingly very specialized scholarship (of both the empirical
and theoretical varieties) on the intricate connections among interna-
tional trade, exchange rate and monetary policy, and tax policy
quickly entered the policy spotlight.2  The analysis of consumption
taxation of financial services gained fresh impetus.3  Older discussions
about the advantages of the value added tax (VAT) were revived,4 and
led (hopefully) to improved public understanding.  But perhaps most
strikingly of all, the majority of U.S. commentators hardly blinked at
* Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia
1 See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, House GOP
Business Tax Reform:  From Theory to Reality (June 18, 2017) [on file with the Tax Law
Review]; Wolfgang Scho¨n, Destination-Based Income Taxation and WTO Law:  A Note, in
Practical Problems in European and International Tax Law (Heike Jochum, Peter Essers,
Michael Lang, Nobert Winkeljohann & Bertil Wiman eds., 2016), https://online.ibfd.org/
kbase/#topic=doc&url=/Collections/ppei/html/ppei_c25.html&hash=PPei_c25&WT.z_nav=
outline.  Special issue, 8 Colum. J. Tax L. 113 (2017).
2 See, e.g., Ruud de Mooij & Michael Keen, “Fiscal Devaluation” and Fiscal Consolida-
tion:  The VAT in Troubled Times, in Fiscal Policy After the Crisis 443 (Alberto Alesina &
Francesco Giavazzi eds., 2013); Arnaud Costinot & Iva´n Werning, The Lerner Symmetry
Theorem:  Generalizations and Qualifications (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 23427, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23427; Gita Gopinath, A
Macroeconomic Perspective on Border Taxes, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 433
(2017).
3 Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen & John Vella, Destination-
Based Cash Flow Taxation (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Tax’n, Working Paper 17/01, 2017),
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/CBTWP1701.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, All Roads Lead to VAT, Commentary on The Saga of
Unfilled Business Tax Reform by Harry L. Gutman, 89 Temp. L. Rev. 341 (2017).
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the suggestion of completely abandoning source-based taxation of for-
eign investments in the United States.5
The abolition of the source-based corporate income tax is, of
course, the very reason why the DBCFT can claim the various neu-
trality properties that its proponents emphasize. Multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs), on the adoption of the DBCFT, would cease to
engage in tax planning of the types that have become notorious, pre-
cisely because the tax they have been busy planning around would no
longer exist.  Instead of seeing this as knocking down a fundamental
pillar of international taxation, however, U.S. commentators have
portrayed it as merely the price to pay for putting an end to past forms
of corporate tax avoidance.6  Judging from the DBCFT debate, the
decade-long assault by leading U.S. tax academics on not only the nor-
mative appeal, but even the very intelligibility, of source-based taxa-
tion seems to have triumphed, at least in changing the discourse on
international taxation.7
Two further aspects of the DBCFT debate were equally remarka-
ble, but more bewildering.  The first is how U.S. scholars and policy-
makers (not to mention multinational corporations, tax and legal
5 Commentators on the GOP Blueprint, Tax Reform Task Force, A Better Way—Our
Vision for a Confident America (2016), https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABet-
terWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf, held different views about whether, after the adoption of the
DBCFT, U.S. withholding taxes would continue to apply to payments of dividends, inter-
ests, and royalties. See Shay et al., note 1, at 69, 79–81.  There are strong reasons to believe
that the answer ought to be “no”:  All such source-based taxation would generate distor-
tions in multinational corporations’ investment decisions, which the DBCFT aims to avoid;
moreover, outbound interest and royalty payments would no longer be deductible to U.S.
payors under the DBCFT.
6 An analogy might be drawn here.  Lobbyists for some U.S. industries (and much of the
U.S. media) portrayed the denial of interest expense deductions under the DBCFT as a
self-standing feature of the GOP Blueprint, failing to recognize that it is instead part of the
very concept of (R-based) cash flow taxation.  See Naomi Jagoda, Tax Reform Challenges
Go Beyond Border Fight, The Hill, Mar. 15, 2017, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/
business-a-lobbying/324005-tax-reform-challenges-go-beyond-border-fight (noting por-
trayal by lobbyists); What If Interest Expenses Were No Longer Deductible, Buttonwood,
The Economist, Feb. 2, 2017, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/02/
02/what-if-interest-expenses-were-no-longer-tax-deductible (media portrayal).  The
DBCFT’s proponents would justifiably dismiss this as a crude misunderstanding.  But they
engage in an opposite kind of mis-ascription. Instead of fully addressing the administrative
issues that the DBCFT must resolve, they advertise it mainly for solving the administrative
problems for the source-based corporate income tax.  See Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P.
Devereux & Helen Simpson, Taxing Corporate Income, in Dimensions of Tax Design:  The
Mirrlees Review 837, 870-71 (Stuart Adam, Timothy Besley, Richard Blundell, Stephen
Bond, Robert Chote, Malcolm Gammie, Paul Johnson, Gareth Myles & James Poterba
eds., 2010), https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7184.  They fail to mention that such
problems have always been “solvable” as long as one is willing to eliminate source-based
taxation; the other parts of the DBCFT design have nothing to do with this “solution.”
7 For reviews of this assault, see Mitchell A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in Inter-
national Taxation, 32 Yale J. on Reg. 311 (2015), and Wei Cui, Minimalism About Source
and Residence, 38 Mich. J. Int’l L. 245 (2017).
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practitioners, and financial analysts) all focused on the very short-
term.  How soon and how large will be the U.S. dollar exchange rate
adjustment to the implicit import tariff and export subsidy effects of
the DBCFT?8  Will the DBCFT even raise revenue for the United
States, either in the short term or in the long term?9  Such questions
dominated the debate, while certain basic premises of the DBCFT
proposal were almost invariably accepted:  The existing U.S. corpo-
rate income tax system was bankrupt and untenable.  “Superficial”
fixes such as lowering corporate tax rates and adopting territorial tax-
ation were inadequate.  The DBCFT would present a better, more
permanent (therefore necessary), and indeed brilliant solution to the
problems of international taxation, but for some unpalatable (or at
least unpredictable) effects on trade, exchange rates, the global distri-
bution of wealth, and the like, and extraneous legal concerns such as
compatibility with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.  In other
words, the DBCFT debate was mainly concerned with the immediate
market and revenue consequences of the DBCFT, not about what it
was all for.  The question of “why?” was instead taken as settled.  The
debate proceeded as though the American public wanted an end to
corporate tax avoidance—and economists wanted an end to distor-
tions in multinationals’ investment decisions—period.
Second and relatedly, the main arguments made for the DBCFT by
its chief advocates were premised not on some new findings in eco-
nomic theory but on intuitive assessments of the severity of certain
well-known institutional problems.  Transfer mispricing (not even pri-
marily in trade in goods, but through intercompany transfers of in-
tangibles), corporate inversions, and tax competition were presented
as problems that have brought corporate income taxation to the brink
of collapse.10  The implementation of the DBCFT, however, would
also face administrative problems, including tax avoidance and eva-
sion in cross-border business-to-consumer transactions that are famil-
iar in the VAT context, and problems in granting tax benefits for
“losses” sustained by exporters.  Is it inconceivable that these
problems can be of the same (or even greater) order of magnitude as
the problems of international tax avoidance under source-based cor-
8 See, e.g., Caroline Freund & Joseph E. Gagnon, Effects of Consumption Taxes on Real
Exchange Rates and Trade Balances (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 17-
5, 2017), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wp17-5.pdf.
9 See Olivier Blanchard & Jason Furman, Who Pays for Border Adjustment?  Sooner or
Later, Americans Do, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Trade & Investment Pol’y Watch (Mar.
8, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/who-pays-border-
adjustment-sooner-or-later-americans-do; David Kamin & Brad Setser, House Plan’s Bad
Math:  Revenue from a Border Adjustment, 155 Tax Notes 105 (Apr. 18, 2017).
10 See, e.g., Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Are We Heading Towards a Corporate
Tax System Fit for the 21st Century, 35 Fisc. Stud. 449, at 453-61 (2014).
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porate income taxation?  After all, transfer mispricing, inversion, tax
evasion in cross-border business-to-consumer transactions, and rent-
seeking through loss trading are all problems in tax administration.
One’s mere conviction that some of these problems are truly severe
surely cannot substitute for an objective comparison of the magni-
tudes of the administrative challenges.  Yet, to my knowledge, no rele-
vant theory has been presented, and even basic arguments are often
lacking.
In this Article, I hope to shed light on the DBCFT debate by exam-
ining forms of corporate income taxation that allocate taxing rights
exclusively based on the residence of shareholders.  In particular, I
consider a type of tax design that previously has not been studied:
“residence-based formulary apportionment” or RBFA.  RBFA is a
form of exclusively-individual-residence-based taxation of corporate
income; it is thus quite consistent with the intellectual zeitgeist re-
ferred to above, that is of bracketing source-countries’ claims to taxing
corporate income.  Superficially, RBFA also seems capable of fulfil-
ling the neutrality objectives that motivate the DBCFT.  Moreover, if
RBFA were feasible, it would have an advantage over a DBCFT in
that it preserves the possibility of taxing corporate income and not just
corporate rent.  This would allow it to serve the key traditional func-
tion of the corporate income tax, that is preventing individual share-
holders from using corporations to defer their income tax liabilities.
Therefore, the feasibility of RBFA clearly deserves some examination.
My tentative conclusion, unfortunately, is that the RBFA is not fea-
sible.  This infeasibility, however, is not primarily attributable to
problems of jurisdiction and enforcement.  I believe the international
legal environment has substantially changed in favor of residence-
based taxation in the last few years, thanks to the implementation of
the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)11 and its as-
sociated Inter-governmental Agreements (IGAs),12 the Common Re-
porting Standards (CRS)13 promoted by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as ele-
ments of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) pro-
ject,14 for example country-by-country reporting.  Nor does the
11 See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corpor
ations/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca (last visited July 1, 2018).
12 See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2018).
13 See What Is the CRS?, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common
-reporting-standard/ (last visited July 1, 2018).
14 See OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last vis-
ited July 1, 2018).
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infeasibility of RBFA lie in the traditional sources of administrative
complexity, for example those associated with integrating entity and
shareholder levels of taxation.  Instead, the reason for RBFA’s in-
feasibility seems fairly unique, although simple.
The infeasibility of RBFA, I believe, has two implications.  First, it
sends those interested in residence-based corporate taxation back to
options for imposing the tax at the shareholder level.  Second, it casts
doubt on whether the idea of taxing corporate income (or profits) by
reference to an immobile factor is at all a useful heuristic for under-
standing the challenges of international corporate taxation.  This idea
has invariably featured in explanations of the DBCFT’s appeal;15
demonstrating its nonreliability seems worthwhile.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II describes the basic idea of
RBFA, offers a taxonomy of various proposals for making the corpo-
rate income tax more residence-based, and situates RBFA within this
taxonomy.  It also discusses a close relative of RBFA, the proposal by
Alberto Giovannini and James Hines for taxing corporate income.16
Next, Part III argues that in light of recent changes in certain basic
norms of international taxation, tax designs that, like RBFA, involve
exercising taxing jurisdiction over foreign corporations should receive
greater consideration.  Part III also considers some implementation
issues that initially may seem to detract from the plausibility of
RBFA, but that arguably are resolvable.  Part IV then presents the
key feasibility challenge facing RBFA, namely, the seeming impossi-
bility for it to avoid certain inter-shareholder externalities that would
undermine financial markets.  Finally, Part V discusses the implica-
tions of Part IV’s finding for residence-based taxation and for the
DBCFT.  It argues that in light of RBFA’s infeasibility, the idea of
taxing corporate income by reference to a fixed factor has yet to lead
to any useful finding.  A brief conclusion follows.
II. RBFA AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER TAX REFORM PROPOSALS
A. Taxing Corporate Profits by Reference to Immobile Factors
Many recent proposals for U.S. corporate tax reform, and not only
the GOP Blueprint for adopting the DBCFT, rely on critiques of
source-based taxation as motivating arguments.17  These critiques
15 Devereux & Vella, note 10, at 471; Auerbach et al., note 3, at 4, 15, 23, 36, 78-79. R
16 Alberto Giovannini & James R. Hines, Jr., Capital Flight and Tax Competition:  Are
There Viable Solutions to Both Problems?, in European Financial Integration 172 (Alberto
Giovannini & Colin Mayer eds., 1991).
17 See, e.g., Eric Toder & Alan D. Viard, Replacing Corporate Tax Revenues with a
Mark-to-Market Tax on Shareholder Income, 69 Nat’l Tax J. 701 (2016).
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have long been familiar.  A quarter of a century ago, Robert Green
explained the rationale for switching to residence-based corporate in-
come taxation in terms almost identical to those used today:
Source-based income taxation is difficult to justify on theo-
retical grounds.  In particular, source-based taxation is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the prevailing theory of the income tax
as a means of allocating the cost of government among indi-
viduals on the basis of ability to pay.  Moreover, it is the at-
tempt by governments to tax income on the basis of source
that gives rise to income shifting and to tax competition
among governments.  The ultimate solution to these
problems would be to move to an international tax system
that uses the residence of individuals as the exclusive basis
for income tax jurisdiction.18
Another refrain of the international tax reform discourse is that us-
ing corporate residence as the basis for taxing corporate income is
both normatively hard to justify and inherently open to abuse.19  The
U.S. decades-long battle against corporate inversions is routinely cited
to support this point.20  Before the introduction of the “destination”
option, therefore, the main conceptual solution to the problems of
source-based corporate taxation was taken to be anchoring corporate
taxation more firmly to individual shareholders’ residence.  This could
mean continuing with traditional corporate taxation, but tying the def-
inition of corporate residence more closely to individual shareholder
residence;21 or it could mean taxing corporate income in some way at
18 Robert A. Green, Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational
Enterprises, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 18, 70 (1993).  As DBCFT proponents point out, these
arguments are also valid against source-based cash flow taxation, or other forms of source-
based tax on corporate rent.  See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & Michael P. Devereux, Cash-
Flow Taxes in an International Setting, 10(3) Am. & Econ. J.:  Econ. Pol’y 69 (2018).
19 Green writes:
It would be possible to devise a residence-based system at the corporate level
by obtaining international agreement on the definition of corporate residence
and giving the residence country exclusive jurisdiction to impose the corporate
income tax.  It would be difficult to justify such an allocation of jurisdiction on
theoretical grounds, however, except insofar as the residence of a corporation
was a good proxy for the residence of its individual shareholders.  Moreover, if
corporations had flexibility to choose their country of residence, as would
likely be the case, the result would be tax competition among countries to in-
duce corporations to become residents.  The end result might be the effective
elimination of corporate income taxation, at least for multinational enterprises.
Green, note 18, at 70 n.271.  For a similar critique, see Auerbach et al., note 6, at 881-82. R
20 See, e.g., Auerbach et al., note 6, at 882. R
21 See generally J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Defending
Worldwide Taxation with a Shareholder-Based Definition of Corporate Residence, 2016
BYU L. Rev. 1681 (2017).
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the individual shareholder level.22  This latter approach, in turn, has
been taken to imply pass-through taxation for all corporations, do-
mestic or foreign.  In such a case, “corporate taxation” would become
the label for an administrative mechanism for imposing tax on ulti-
mate shareholders, much as “partnership taxation” is a label for taxing
partners and not partnerships.  Or it could be implemented in combi-
nation with a mark-to-market approach for publicly-traded compa-
nies.23  If any combination of these methods was feasible and
effective, both international profit-shifting and international tax com-
petition would be eliminated.
Advocates of the DBCFT introduced a somewhat different, and
seemingly more general, formulation of the problem of taxing interna-
tional corporate income.  The question, it is suggested, is how corpo-
rate profits can be taxed by reference to some immobile factor.24
Corporate residence is highly mobile because it is inherently artificial.
Sites of production are less artificial but also often mobile:  Multina-
tionals in possession of firm-specific technology or other mobile assets
can earn rent by locating production in any number of places.  If cor-
porate profits are taxed by reference to the location of production,
firm choices inevitably will be distorted.  The fundamental challenge
in corporate international taxation, it was thought, should be con-
ceived as identifying immobile factors for anchoring the corporate tax.
This formulation implies the notion of allocating the taxing rights
over a given base of corporate income to different countries.  That
notion has a surprising connection—but natural once reflected
upon—to the idea of formulary apportionment.  Traditionally, formu-
lary apportionment has been thought of either as a technique of trans-
fer pricing among related parties that supplements the arm’s length
principle,25 or as a way of allocating the entire corporate tax base of a
corporate group and avoiding transfer pricing among related parties
all together.  Either way, the use of a formula may be viewed as
resorting to less manipulable factors than some alternative.  For exam-
22 Auerbach et al., note 19, at 880-81; Green, note 18, at 70-71. R
23 See, e.g., Eric Toder & Alan D. Viard, Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., Major Sur-
gery Needed:  A Call for Structural Reform of the U.S. Corporate Income Tax 29-31
(2014), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/major-surgery-needed-call-structural-
reform-us-corporate-income-tax.
24 Auerbach & Devereux, note 18, at 1; Auerbach et al., note 3, at 4, 15, 23, 79; Michael R
P. Devereux & John Vella, Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate Tax
Reform 10 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Tax’n, Working Paper No. 17/07, 2017), https://
www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/
Series_17/WP1707.pdf.
25 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment—Myths and
Prospects:  Promoting Better International Tax Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and
Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative, 3 World Tax J. 371 (2011) (giving an overview of
the concept of formulary apportionment as a technique of transfer pricing).
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ple, taxpayers’ sales, assets, payroll, or other expenses may all be less
manipulable than contractual allocations of profit or the residence of
related corporations.  The natural affinity between the idea of allocat-
ing taxing rights over a given tax base and formulary apportionment
has recently led to the latter being used to describe the allocation of
the corporate tax base generally, and not just among related parties.
For example, apportionment of corporate profits might be made by
reference only to sales to final consumers.26  If the location of final
consumers is highly immobile, then such apportionment may be the
solution to the fundamental problem of international taxation (as de-
scribed by DBCFT advocates).
Against this conceptual background, residence-based formulary ap-
portionment (RBFA) can be seen as combining formulary apportion-
ment, the new formulation of the problem of international taxation
preferred by DBCFT advocates, and the traditional case for resi-
dence-based taxation.  The immobility of individual consumers is just
the immobility of their residence.  The residence of individual inves-
tors is similarly immobile.  Under RBFA, the income (or any other
corporate tax base) of a corporation would be allocated to the coun-
tries of the ultimate individual shareholders of the corporation, in pro-
portion to the equity ownership of individual shareholders from each
country.  The countries of ultimate shareholder residence thus would
tax both domestic and foreign corporations, at the residence coun-
tries’ tax rates, based on how much corporate income of each corpora-
tion was ultimately owned by their own residents.  A country would
adopt RBFA if it (1) ceased to tax the income of domestic corpora-
tions insofar as such income was allocable to nonresident individual
owners, and (2) commenced to tax the income of foreign corporations
insofar as such income was allocable to resident individual owners.
The design of the corporate income tax using the RBFA approach
has not been previously studied.27  Instead, the meaning of taxing cor-
porate income by reference to individual shareholder residence gener-
26 For a proposal for a “destination-based” formulary apportionment of an income tax
base, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating
Business Profits for Tax Purposes:  A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 Fla.
Tax. Rev. 347 (2009); for a proposal for a “destination-based” formulary apportionment of
a cash flow tax base, see Michael P. Devereux & Rita de la Feria, Designing and Imple-
menting a Destination-Based Corporate Tax (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Tax’n, Working
Paper No. 14/07, 2014), http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/5081/1/WP1407.pdf.
27 Toder & Viard, note 23, at 25 (“A potentially even more attractive method would R
allocate the corporation’s income in proportion to where its stockholders reside.  We are
not aware of any literature that discusses this approach and we are not sure whether it
would be practical . . . . [The] problems may not be insurmountable and we recommend
further efforts to examine whether and how such an allocation method could be made
operational.”).
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ally has been interpreted in terms of pass-through and/or accrual
taxation of individual shareholders.  Comparing RBFA with share-
holder-level taxation is a theme that runs through this and the next
two Parts.
Another important comparison is between RBFA and formulary
apportionment based on final sales.28  Since both are in theory equally
good solutions to the challenge of international corporate taxation (as
formulated by DBCFT proponents), the remaining question is
whether either option is feasible, and if both are, which is more feasi-
ble.  I have previously argued that at least along one dimension,
RBFA ought to be more feasible than final-sales-factor formulary ap-
portionment.29  This is because the identities of transacting parties are
not generally transmitted in the sales of goods and services—parties
transacting in goods and services often can remain anonymous with
each other—but the identities of parties to financial claims generally
are transmitted.30  Therefore, it ought to be easier to determine the
locations of ultimate shareholders (since they are linked to the corpo-
ration through a chain of nonanonymous financial claims) than the
locations of ultimate consumers.  However, it does not follow from
this that RBFA is more feasible than final-sales-factor formulary ap-
portionment overall, or that either crosses a relevant threshold level
of feasibility.  Parts V pursues these questions further.
B. Exclusively-Individual-Shareholder-Residence-Based Corporate
Taxation:  A Taxonomy
Strictly speaking, no previous proposal (that I am aware of) has
contemplated making the income tax liability of a multinational com-
pany (or corporate group) depend exclusively on shareholder resi-
dence.  Previous discussions have only approximated this idea,
generally by making individual shareholders the taxpayers.31  Among
arrangements for taxing corporate income in the hands of sharehold-
ers, some also bear greater affinity to RBFA than others.32  In the
following, I provide a taxonomy.
28 See Devereux & Vella, note 24, at 11-20 (comparing shareholder-level flow-through R
or accrual taxation with final-sales-based formulary apportionment).
29 Wei Cui, Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation:  A Critical Appraisal, 67 U. Toronto
L.J. 301, 346-47 (2017).
30 See Devereux & Vella, note 24, at 11-20 (comparing shareholder-level flow-through R
or accrual taxation with final-sales-based formulary apportionment).
31 See, e.g., Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Shifting the Burden of Taxation from
the Corporate to the Personal Level and Getting the Corporate Tax Rate Down to 15
Percent, 69 Nat’l Tax J. 643 (2016).
32 The closest previous scholars have come to the idea of RBFA is Giovannini & Hines,
note 16, at 172, and discussed further at Subsection II.B.2. R
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1. Shareholder Attribution:  Distinguishing Pass-Through and
Integration
The idea of treating income earned by a corporation as income di-
rectly and currently earned by its (ultimate) shareholders, and subject-
ing such income to tax in the hands of such shareholders may not
sound like a form of corporate taxation.  Indeed, it easily generates
confusion.  It is thus important to have a clear and coherent statement
of the idea.
Consider a tax (1) on the income of a corporation determined at the
level of the corporation, (2) taxable to the (ultimate) individual share-
holders of the corporation, but (3) which is distinct from the other
income tax liabilities of the individuals.  I label any tax that satisfies
these criteria as adopting a shareholder-attribution approach to cor-
porate taxation.  The basic claim is that the shareholder-attribution
approach is a form of corporate taxation, distinguished from the stan-
dard corporate income tax mainly in that it makes shareholders and
not the corporation liable.
Most past discussions of reforming the corporate income tax by in-
troducing shareholder-level taxation do not follow the shareholder at-
tribution approach.  For example, many authors refer to the U.S.
regimes for taxing the owners of S corporations and partnerships as
the relevant model for the shareholder-level tax on corporate in-
come.33  Such an approach may invite the question of why it is not
more naturally described as the abolition of the corporate income tax
and the enactment of a substitute for it in the individual income tax.
In response, some authors mention the possibility that corporate in-
come, once attributed to individual shareholders, may be subject to
two nominally distinct taxes, one being the corporate and the other
being the personal income tax.34
I believe these previous (quick) discussions of shareholder-level
corporate taxation obscure two issues.  First, attributing income from
corporation to shareholders does not require “pass-through” treat-
ment.  Under the U.S. controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and other
33 See, e.g., Green, note 18, at 70-71 (“This system could be implemented by having each R
corporation calculate its taxable income based on its separate accounts, as is done under
current law.  The corporation would then allocate this income among its shareholders, both
individual and corporate.  This process would continue through any chains of corporate
ownership until all corporate income was allocated to individual shareholders”); Toder &
Viard, note 17, at 702; Devereux & Vella, note 24, at 11-12. R
34 Green, note 18, at 71 (“any country that wished to retain a system under which corpo- R
rate income was taxed twice could do so by imposing a separate ‘corporate income’ tax on
its resident individual shareholders with respect to the corporate income allocated to
them”); Giovannini & Hines, note 16, at 195 (“Corporate income would be attributed to R
individual shareholders without deferral, and therefore subject (potentially) to taxation at
the individual level and the corporate level.”)
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anti-deferral regimes, for example, the character, geographical source,
and other features of income generally do not flow through to share-
holders, nor do losses.35  None of these regimes pursues the goal of
taxing corporate income as though it was received directly by the
shareholder.  That is the goal defining pass-through taxation.
TABLE 1
TAXONOMY OF CORPORATE- V. SHAREHOLDER-LEVEL
TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME
 Shareholder 
mark-to-
market 
Pass-through 
(e.g. 
partnerships) 
Anti-
deferral 
regimes 
(e.g. 
Subpart 
F) 
Integration Shareholder 
attribution 
Giovannini-
Hines 
RBFA / 
traditional 
corporate 
taxation 
Tax is on 
corporate 
income 
determined at 
the corporate 
level 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Taxable to the 
(ultimate) 
individual 
shareholders 
n/a ? ? ? ? ? (for 
refund) 
? 
Tax attributes 
preserved 
when 
allocated to 
shareholders 
n/a ? ? ? ? ? n/a 
Distinct from 
other income 
tax liabilities 
of individuals 
? ? ? ? (reduces 
shareholder 
liability) 
? ? n/a 
For international corporate taxation, the relevant goals instead may
be taken to include the prevention of deferral, and neutrality with re-
spect to multinationals’ investment decisions.  Preserving the charac-
ter of income, passing through losses, and generally achieving
neutrality between the use and nonuse of an entity for business activi-
ties, are arguably nonessential goals.  Therefore, in describing the
shareholder-level corporate tax, anti-deferral regimes offer a more ap-
propriate analogy than the taxation of flow-through entities.  If this is
35 See Green, note 18, at 77.  Indeed, Green extensively cites the “shareholder allocation R
prototype” in the 1992 U.S. Treasury study of integrating the individual and corporate tax
systems as a model for shareholder-residence-based international taxation.  See Treasury
Integration Study:  Treasury Dep’t, Report on Integration of the Individual and Corporate
Tax Systems:  Taxing Business Income Once 27-38 (1992), https://www.treasury.gov/re-
source-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Integration-1992.pdf.  As the study itself em-
phasizes, the shareholder allocation prototype is not a pass-through regime but simply
allows credit for corporate income tax paid to be given to individual shareholders.  Id. at
27.
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correct, the shareholder-level corporate tax basically envisions a vast
expansion of anti-deferral rules to all corporations and individuals,
and the elimination of source-based taxation.
But even this analogy may not be correct.  The second issue that
past discussions have tended to obscure is component (3) of the share-
holder-attribution approach above, that is whether the liability of the
shareholder is distinct from her individual income tax liability.  Under
pass-through taxation, because income is already currently attributed
to individual owners, it is believed that there is no longer any need for
entity-level taxation (understood as an anti-deferral device).36  There-
fore, the owner’s liability for the income earned through pass-through
entities is the same type of individual income liability that other types
of income generate.  Interestingly, the taxation of subpart F income
attributed to U.S. individuals also involves only a single layer, not two
layers, of tax.  If two layers of U.S. tax were desired on subpart F
income, both deemed and actual distributions from CFCs should be
taxable, but, under subpart F rules, previously taxed earnings can be
distributed free of tax.37  Thus the anti-deferral regime is similar to the
pass-through regimes in adopting the aim of ensuring that the same
economic income is not taxed at both the entity and the shareholder
level.  This goal, of course, is also shared by corporate consolidation
regimes and corporate integration proposals (neither of which in-
volves pass-through).38
The shareholder-attribution approach does not adopt this goal.  In
order to find a shareholder-level tax that substitutes for a corporate-
level tax, it is enough to attribute corporate income to individual
shareholders and subject it to tax.  This idea is in itself consistent with
a rule where an eventual dividend distribution of the corporate in-
come to the shareholder is again taxed under the personal income
tax.39
This second issue is especially important to point out because it may
have led to an exaggerated sense of the complexity inherent in a
36 John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe:
“Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do,” 78 Tex. L. Rev. 885, 892-96 (2000).
37 IRC § 959.  This also applies to the subpart F income includible in income by a U.S.
corporation.  Id.  In that case, the subpart F income is subject to tax by both the domestic
corporation and the U.S. individual.  IRC §§ 1, 11.
38 Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Understanding Consolidated Returns, 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 125,
128-33 (2012).
39 In other words, to maintain two layers of tax on corporate income, one does not need
to impose two taxes (one personal and one corporate) on the same item of income that is
attributed (but not distributed) to the individual shareholder, as suggested by the com-
ments of Green and of Giovannini and Hines.  See note 34.  Instead, it is enough to tax the R
income attributed (under the corporate tax), and tax it again (under the personal tax)
when distributed.
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shareholder-attribution approach to corporate taxation.  Green, for
example, suggested that after requiring shareholders to
include their allocable share of corporate income on their
personal income tax returns and pay tax on their total in-
come to their country of residence . . . [t]o avoid double taxa-
tion by the residence country, the shareholders would
increase their stock basis by the amount of corporate income
allocated to them.  Shareholders would then treat actual cor-
porate distributions as a return of capital to the extent of
their stock basis, and would treat any excess as capital gain.40
According to Green, the shareholder-level tax “would entail . . . all
of the administrative difficulties inherent in a system of pass through
integration.”41  But that need not be the case.  If shareholder attribu-
tion is simply a substitute for the corporate-level tax, there is no rea-
son to adjust share basis for income attributed to the shareholder, any
more than there is reason to adjust share basis after a corporation has
paid income tax.  All that a shareholder-attribution approach has to
do by way of avoiding multiple layers of taxation is to provide some
form of intercorporate dividend exemption.42
To summarize, while a tax on corporate income to be imposed at
the shareholder level can mean different things, under a minimalist
approach, all that is required is that (1) corporate income be attrib-
uted to shareholders even in the absence of distribution, and (2) the
individual shareholders bear tax liability on such income attributed
that is distinct from the tax liability that they bear on other types of
income actually received.  There need not be any commitment to pre-
serving the character of income when income is attributed from the
corporation to the shareholder (that is, pass-through), nor to any spe-
cial treatment of the future receipt of income that corresponds to in-
come already attributed (that is, avoiding double taxation).  In other
words, shareholder attribution, as a way of replicating the corporate
tax, rejects the aspirations of pass-through and integration, and em-
braces distortions in entity choice.
Defining the shareholder-attribution approach to corporate taxa-
tion in the way I have is useful for three reasons.43  First, it presents
40 Green, note 18, at 70. R
41 Id. at 72-73.
42 Capital gains can be treated as a form of taxable income, even if they are realized
from the disposition of shares from which underlying corporate income has been attributed
to shareholders.
43 The shareholder attribution approach is also distinct from mark-to-market or other
forms of accrual accounting at the shareholder level (discussed by Toder & Viard, note 17, R
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the simplest conception of a shareholder-level substitute for corporate
taxation that is not an instance of simply eliminating corporate taxa-
tion.  It also immediately dispenses with the complexities of pass-
through and integration.  Second, it serves as a useful point of refer-
ence for RBFA.  RBFA would not attribute income to shareholders,
and would impose a corporate-level rather than a shareholder-level
tax.  And third, DBCFT advocates’ formulation of the basic problem
of international taxation directly points to shareholder attribution as a
solution:  If corporate income is taxed only by reference to sharehold-
ers, it is clearly taxed by reference to a relatively fixed factor.  How-
ever, some DBCFT advocates have explicitly rejected the feasibility of
the shareholder-attribution approach, and use this as a motivating ar-
gument for the DBCFT.44  My aim is to partly examine whether
RBFA fares better than the shareholder-attribution approach on fea-
sibility grounds.
Whether the shareholder-attribution approach describes an appeal-
ing form of entity taxation is a completely different question.  Here
two things may be noted.45  First, DBCFT advocates tend to take cor-
porate taxation as a given.  Neutrality with respect to entity choice, or
coordination between entity-  and individual-level taxes, are simply
not issues they intend to tackle.  Second, many corporate tax reform
proposals advocate replacing a tax on corporate income with a tax on
corporate rent.46  This means that the justification for entity-level tax-
ation may already rest on something else other than the prevention of
deferral.47  By contrast, existing pass-through, integration, and, of
course, anti-deferral regimes, are very much motivated by a concep-
tion of the purpose of an entity-level tax as dealing with deferral.
In any case, in discussing RBFA’s feasibility below, I am mainly
comparing RBFA with the shareholder-attribution approach to corpo-
rate taxation, and do not conceive of shareholder-level taxation as em-
bracing pass-through or integration.
at 702, for example, as one way to reform the corporate income tax).  The distinction is due
to component (1) of the definition:  The tax base is determined at the entity level.
44 See Auerbach et al., note 18, at 880-81 (claiming that the shareholder-level tax is R
infeasible, largely based on the shareholder attribution conception of such a tax).
45 See Cui, note 29, at 316-19. R
46 In addition to DBCFT proposals, see Edward D. Kleinbard, The Right Tax at the
Right Time, 21 Fla. Tax Rev. 208 (2017); Robin Boadway & Jean-Franc¸ois Tremblay, Cor-
porate Tax Reform: Issues and Prospects for Canada (Mowat Centre School of Public Pol-
icy and Governance, U. of Toronto Research Paper #88, 2014), https://mowatcentre.ca/
corporate-tax-reform;
47 Id.
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2. The Giovannini-Hines Proposal:  Income Attribution Plus
Revenue Transfer
In the early 1990’s, Giovannini and Hines proposed a model for cor-
porate taxation, to be implemented in the European Community, that
would be based exclusively on individual shareholder residence.48
This model displays an interesting combination of both the share-
holder-attribution approach—as defined above—and the approach of
RBFA.
In the Giovannini-Hines model, corporations operating in Europe
would be taxed on their income in the countries where they conduct
business—the countries of “source”—at a uniform 50% rate.49  The
income tax base would be computed through a harmonized method
based on Haig-Simons principles.  While subject to source taxation,
the corporations also would report their income to their ultimate
shareholders, such that corporate income would be attributed to indi-
vidual shareholders (even if absolute precision was not possible when
share ownerships change).  The residence countries of the sharehold-
ers then would require the individual residents to file tax returns to
report such attributed corporate income.  Residence countries could
not set tax rates higher than 50% on such income, but could set lower
rates.  When a residence country’s rate was lower than 50%, the coun-
try would refund the excess of the source country tax collected over
the shareholder tax liability to the individual shareholders.  Conse-
quently, the corporate income attributed to individual shareholders
would be taxed only at the resident country rate.  The source country
would transfer the revenue collected from the corporation to the
shareholder residence country through a clearing house system.50
The Giovannini-Hines model is closely related to the shareholder-
attribution approach to corporate taxation described above.  Corpo-
rate income would be attributed to ultimate individual shareholders
through chains of ownership, and taxable to the shareholders.  Moreo-
ver, Giovannini and Hines do not introduce any element of pass-
through or integration.  They suggest that intermediate companies
that only hold shares in European companies subject to tax in the way
described above would be exempt from tax in the system.51  This is
enough to mitigate multiple layers of corporate taxation, but does not
aim to integrate entity and individual-level taxation.  What the Gi-
ovannini-Hines model adds to the shareholder-attribution approach is
the withholding of the residence country tax by the source country
48 Giovannini & Hines, note 16, at 172. R
49 Id. at 194.
50 Id. at 195.
51 Id.
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government.  This form of withholding brings many of the advantages
that are associated with RBFA.  For example, it would solve the li-
quidity problem for shareholders.  It also would leverage the compli-
ance tendencies of corporations.  It might also mobilize the
enforcement capacity of the source country.52
While the Giovannini-Hines proposal thus interestingly anticipates
both the shareholder-attribution and RBFA approach of taxing corpo-
rate income, I mainly consider it as a form of shareholder attribution.
The reason is that by combining shareholder attribution and RBFA,
the Giovannini-Hines proposal inevitably would require revenue
transfers among national governments.  I believe that no such system
of transfers—even if they have been implemented to some extent in
Europe—should be assumed in discussing the design of international
taxation in general.  I follow Michael Keen and David Wildasin in tak-
ing binding national budget constraints as defining the problem of in-
ternational taxation.53  Relaxing these constraints risks assuming the
problem away.54  By themselves, neither shareholder attribution nor
RBFA requires intergovernmental transfers. Therefore my focus is to
compare these nonhybrid approaches.
III. RATIONALES FOR RBFA AND FAVORABLE FACTORS FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
RBFA would not involve income attribution to shareholders, and
would impose a tax on corporations rather than shareholders.  The
comparison of RBFA with the shareholder-attribution approach
should start with some very general considerations about the choice
between entity-  and individual-level taxation.
A. Taxing Corporations v. Taxing Shareholders
A basic justification for the corporate income tax is that it prevents
individuals from deferring tax liability by earning income through dis-
tinct legal entities.  To achieve this objective, any country should tax
corporations owned by its individual taxpayers, regardless of whether
the corporation is domestic or foreign.  If, as a legal matter, a country
cannot claim the right to tax the foreign income of a foreign corpora-
tion owned by a resident, simply because the corporation is foreign
52 Although the incentives to enforce might be diluted because any (net) revenue col-
lected from income attributed to foreign owners would not remain in the source country.
53 Michael Keen & David Wildasin, Pareto-Efficient International Taxation, 94 Am.
Econ. Rev. 259, 259 (2004).
54 To put it differently, if intergovernmental revenue transfers are possible, there may be
many optimal solutions to the problems of international taxation.
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(for example, formed under foreign law and operated abroad), then a
fundamental objective of the corporate income tax would be immedi-
ately frustrated.  For this reason, countries have often implemented
legal systems where foreign income earned through foreign corpora-
tions is effectively subject to current taxation.  Under CFC regimes,
for example, foreign corporate income is taxed to domestic sharehold-
ers by deeming distributions to have been made.55  Such legal devices
are applied when the risk of taxpayer abuse is particularly high, for
example, in cases of mobile passive income and other “foreign base
company income,” and/or where the shareholders have control of for-
eign corporations’ distribution policy.56  In other words, the legal prin-
ciple about the nontaxability of the foreign income of a foreign
corporation can be defeated by other legal devices, as long as there is
a sufficient policy justification and enforcement is possible.
Given the objective of preventing deferral, the choice between tax-
ing corporations and taxing shareholders involves balancing various
administrative considerations.  For example, taxing corporations
avoids the problem of shareholder liquidity:  Instead of asking share-
holders to pay cash tax regardless of whether the corporations actually
distributed income, taxing corporations makes the entities that have
the cash the taxpayers.57  On the other hand, enforcement against a
domestic individual is in many respects easier and more powerful (for
example, through the seizure of other personal assets) than enforce-
ment against a foreign corporation.  This may seem to favor imposing
the tax at the shareholder level.  Nonetheless, if the foreign corpora-
tion in question is a large firm that engages extensively in market
transactions and that by necessity relies on legal systems to enforce
contracts with third parties and the intra-firm division of rent, the cor-
poration’s tendency towards voluntary compliance (even though it is
foreign) may be higher than the compliance tendency of individuals.58
Imposing a tax at the corporate level thus would allow tax authorities
to tap into fundamental institutional drivers of compliance, as well as
to make collection easier.59
In fact, from a tax administration perspective, the optimal tax de-
sign may involve both forms of taxation.  Corporate-level taxation
55 See, e.g., IRC § 951(a).
56 See, e.g., IRC § 952(a).
57 See Green, note 18, at 72; see also Auerbach & Devereux note 18, at 880. R
58 Wei Cui, Taxation Without Information:  The Institutional Foundations of Modern
Tax Collection, 20 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 93, 138 (2018).
59 This is recognized, for example, in the 1993 Treasury Integration Study, note 35, at 29 R
(“[B]ecause tax is more likely to be collected if paid at the corporate level, the shareholder
allocation prototype retains the current system requiring payment at the corporate level
and then allocates to share-holders the corporation’s taxable income and taxes paid.”)
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may be particularly suitable for large firms that can deliver economy
of scale in compliance and collection, whereas shareholder-level taxa-
tion, or at least shareholder secondary liability, may be appropriate
for smaller firms.  What should be recognized from the start, however,
is that in designing individual-residence-based taxation of corporation
income, there is no predetermined, arbitrary, and absolute legal norm
that says that countries cannot tax foreign corporations on foreign in-
come.  There are many actual and possible examples of legal rules that
counter this understanding of international tax law (or of international
law).
Consider, for instance, the following hypothetical.  Recall that,
under U.S. CFC rules, subpart F income is taxed to U.S. shareholders
as deemed distributions.60  What if the CFC is further required to
withhold U.S. tax on such deemed distributions?  Such a requirement
would effectively impose a tax directly on the CFC on its subpart F
income, yet it is not clear to me that any legal norm precludes the
possibility of the U.S. enacting such a requirement.  The requirement
to withhold on nominal income is illustrated by the obligation, under
the U.S. original issue discount rules, of U.S. debtors to withhold tax
on interest accruing to foreign creditors.61  The requirement on non-
residents to withhold U.S. tax on payments to nonresidents is illus-
trated both by secondary withholding on dividends62 and the FATCA
“pass-through withholding” rules.63
Extensive taxing jurisdiction over foreign corporations is of course
not just a phenomenon of U.S. tax law.64  Especially in the last few
years, national governments have been able to extend such jurisdic-
tion under a number of distinct initiatives that have received wide in-
ternational support.  The country-by-country reporting regime
promoted by the OECD BEPS project, for example, allows any par-
ticipating country to effectively impose disclosure obligations on the
entire corporate groups of MNCs, as long as one member of the cor-
porate group operates in that country.65  Similarly, the U.K. diverted
60 IRC § 951(a)(1)(A).
61 IRC § 871(a)(1)(C).
62 IRC § 861 (a)(2)(B).
63 IRC § 1471 (b)(1)(D).
64 Besides the examples discussed in the text, consider the tax many countries impose on
the capital gain nonresidents realize on the sale of foreign corporations’ shares, where the
value of such shares derives (often only indirectly) from some domestic asset such as real
estate.  See Wei Cui, Taxing Indirect Transfers:  Improving an Instrument for Stemming
Tax and Legal Base Erosion, 33 Va. Tax Rev. 653, 654-55 (2014).
65 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action
13—2015 Final Report 16, 21 (2015), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/transfer-pricing
-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report_
9789264241480-en#page4.
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profit tax66 and the Australian multinational anti-avoidance law67 en-
able these countries to impose a tax, under certain conditions, on any
corporate group that has a subsidiary in them.  Controversial just a
few years ago, these tax policy measures now are not only widely re-
garded as conceptually defensible68 but have also been accepted by
other national governments.  Like the “extraterritorial jurisdiction”
exhibited by the country-by-country regime, imposing taxes or tax-re-
lated obligations on entire corporate groups by virtue of just “one
point of contact” seems now a firm part of positive international law.
Going beyond this, the 113 jurisdictions that entered into IGAs with
the U.S. to implement FATCA69 can be interpreted as accepting the
jurisdictional claim that the U.S. has laid on foreign financial institu-
tions, even if the only connection that such an institution has with the
United States is acting as a nominee or agent receiving payments from
the United States.
It is possible that, in the past, exclusively individual-shareholder-
residence-based corporate income taxation was thought as legally fea-
sible only if the tax was imposed at the shareholder level.  But this
belief no longer tracks the state of international law in the tax sphere.
The legal possibility of taxing multinationals themselves is wide open.
The real question is what policy substantively is justifiable (and
enforceable).
RBFA would achieve the goal of preventing deferral just like CFC
regimes.  But it also aims to accomplish more, that is to allocate the
corporate tax base of MNCs away from source countries, and to end
profit-shifting, tax competition, and distortions in MNC investment
decisions.70  Assuming that these are compelling policy goals, coun-
tries have even greater reason not to feel constrained by traditional
legal norms regarding the possibility of taxing foreign corporations on
foreign income than in the design of CFC rules.  Moreover, taxing
multinationals directly instead of their shareholders may bring very
important administrative advantages, and therefore should be ex-
pected to play a major role in corporate tax reform.
These are general reasons for considering both RBFA and a share-
holder approach in designing a residence-based corporate tax.  I now
turn to some specific feasibility comparisons between the two.  In
66 Finance Act 2015, c. 11, §§ 77–116 (Eng.).
67 Tax Laws Amendment (Combating Multinational Tax Avoidance) Act 2015 (Cth)
(Austl.).
68 As the Paul Oosterhuis and Amanda Parsons argue, the United States may well want
to adopt this approach in the future.  Paul Oosterhuis & Amanda Parson, Destination-
Based Income Taxation:  Neither Principled Nor Practical?,  71 Tax L. Rev. 515 (2018).
69 See U.S. Treasury, note 12. R
70 See Section II.A.
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principle, RBFA requires a taxpayer corporation to apportion its in-
come (or loss), computed in some way, to ultimate individual share-
holders grouped by their countries of residence.  If Country A imposes
a RBFA-style tax, the corporation would pay to Country A an amount
of income tax equal to Country A’s RBFA tax rate multiplied by the
income apportioned to investors from County A.  For this to be possi-
ble, the corporation needs to (1) know its ultimate ownership pattern
during the tax period, (2) know how to compute its tax base, and, of
course, (3) be willing to subject itself to Country A’s jurisdiction and
comply with its laws.  Each of these elements may seem far-fetched to
many readers.  There are, however, also many good reasons for sus-
pending disbelief.
B. Determining Patterns of Ultimate Ownership
Corporate equity ownership is a type of financial claim where the
identities of the corporation and the immediate shareholders are al-
most always known to each other.71  Therefore, the identity of an ulti-
mate shareholder is known to the corporate entity she immediately
owns, which in turn can transmit this information down the chain of
ownership.  For the purpose of apportionment to investor countries,
RBFA would not require the taxpayer corporation to know the identi-
ties of ultimate individual shareholders or even how many there are.
The corporation only would need to know the aggregate percentage of
ownership associated with each relevant country of shareholder resi-
dence.  The information needed to be obtained from any shareholder
that is not an ultimate individual shareholder is thus comparable with
what U.S. withholding agents need to obtain from Qualified In-
termediaries regarding the ultimate beneficial owners of payments of
FDAP income subject to § 1441 withholding:  not their identities, but
only their residence status and proportions of entitlement to payment,
are included.72
Indeed, if it were not for the problem of intra-shareholder externali-
ties discussed in Part IV, the relative simplicity of aggregating share-
holder residence information is a key advantage of RBFA over the
shareholder attribution approach to taxing corporate income.  Under
the latter approach, income must be apportioned to each ultimate in-
71 If the shareholders act through nominees or agents and the corporation has privity
only with the latter, then the corporation is connected to the shareholder through two links
of nonanonymous relationship, as the nominee/agent must know the identities of the
principals.
72 That is, (1) if it is a U.S. person but no W-9 is provided, backup withholding applies;
(2) if it is a non-U.S. person and treaty benefits are claimed, which treaties are invoked;
and (3) if it is a non-U.S. person and no treaty benefits are claimed, regular withholding
applies.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TAX\71-3\TAX304.txt unknown Seq: 21 31-AUG-18 13:50
2018] RESIDENCE-BASED FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT 571
dividual shareholder and such information must also be transmitted to
each individual shareholder in the absence of actual distribution.  This
is, of course, not unprecedented:  It is how anti-deferral regimes
work.73  Nonetheless, the absence of payment to particular individuals
would seem to make such a (global) apportionment exercise very dif-
ficult to verify, even in a sophisticated financial system.  This concern,
for example, is particularly acute for the Giovannini-Hines proposal,
where residence countries offer refunds for income apportioned but
not received:74  the risk of fraud in such a system seems intolerable.
But even under a pure shareholder attribution approach that requires
tax payment instead of refunds, a system that relies on the accuracy of
accounting exercises that are not accompanied by payments and other
transactional information (for example, market prices) seems hard to
accept.  The incentives for individual fraud may be just too great.
In other words, the key feasibility objection to the shareholder-at-
tribution approach may not have to do with complications in tax ac-
counting.  Tax accounting methods to achieve pass-through and
integration would indeed impose such complexities, but as already ar-
gued, the shareholder-attribution approach need not take on such
complexities.  Instead, the chief problem may be the need to appor-
tion taxable income through chains of ownership without payment.
By contrast, RBFA would require all intermediate entities between
a corporation and its ultimate shareholders to act as information-pro-
viding intermediaries.  The scope of information transmission would
be wider not only than the qualified intermediary regime but even
than the FATCA regime (where all financial institutions and a wide
range of entities not engaged in active business must participate in
compliance).  RBFA, however, is a proposal for a fundamental change
in corporate taxation:  It would completely replace source-based cor-
porate taxation.  Many of the intermediary entities may themselves be
subject to RBFA (for example, insofar as they receive income other
than from other corporations).75  Moreover, the information transmit-
ted is truly simple:  It concerns only percentages of ultimate share-
holder ownership aggregated at the country level.  Finally, not only
does the administrative task seem straightforward, any fraud by the
corporate taxpayer may require collusion among multiple sharehold-
73 Attribution without distribution may be less common under flow-through regimes,
insofar as flow-through entities such as partnerships tend to distribute profits.
74 See Giovannini & Hines, note 16. R
75 Moreover, the implementation of RBFA, if otherwise feasible, would require funda-
mental changes to tax treaties and not just add-on arrangements such as FATCA-type
IGAs.  Thus the widespread transmission of shareholder information is not unimaginable.
See Section III.C.
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ers:  The risk of such collective fraud is arguably lower than the risk of
individual fraud under the shareholder attribution approach.
Ownership changes have long been regarded as posing tremendous
administrative problems for any form of pass-through or integration
system.76  They also would pose problems for RBFA, but in two po-
tentially very different ways.  First, if RBFA eventually needed to be
combined with some attribution mechanism to be viable, then the
problems of ownership change generally relevant for such a mecha-
nism would also infect RBFA implementation.  Second, and by con-
trast, when individual shareholder information was aggregated at the
country level, changes in ownership would matter for a corporation’s
computation of its tax liability only because the corporation might be
owned by residents from different countries in changing proportions
during the course of a tax period (for example, a year).  In this latter
case, some way of computing an annual average of (ultimate) owner-
ship would be sufficient.77
C. Whose Tax Law to Apply?
If, under RBFA, a corporation has to pay income tax to different
countries of ultimate shareholder residence, whose tax law should the
corporation apply to determine its tax base?  This question also arises
for the shareholder-attribution approach to corporate taxation, since,
under such proposals, firms owned by shareholders from different
countries also need to provide information to the shareholders about
what income accrues to them, based on their respective tax laws.78
To answer this question, it is important to reflect on what corporate
tax policy would look like when it was purely individual-residence-
based.  Arguably, much tax policy directed at business firms is source-
based:  Policymakers aim to stimulate investment, incentivize R&D,
boost employment, encourage sustainable energy use and environ-
mental preservation, and so on, in particular places.  These are often
the places where both the owners reside and the firms operate.  Coun-
tries would have much less incentive to adopt such policies when the
76 See Treasury Integration Study, note 35, at 33-35. R
77 When the goal is to determine the tax liabilities of individuals, imputation/accrual
would have to be done very accurately to track the ownership period of particular individu-
als.  When the goal is to determine the tax liabilities of a corporation (owned by various
individuals), however, the requirement of precision regarding ownership periods of partic-
ular individuals could be relaxed.
78 Green, note 18, at 72.  As a matter of compliance realities, many multinational com- R
panies already have to file tax returns in multiple jurisdictions—both national and subna-
tional—and thus apply different tax laws to the same business facts.  Anti-deferral regimes
also generally require foreign income to be computed according to the residence countries’
tax laws, which are invariably different from source countries’ tax laws.
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firms to which they apply operate elsewhere in the world.  U.S.
lawmakers are much less interested in tinkering with the corporate tax
base for firms that operate in Mexico and Vietnam than firms that
operate in Ohio and Wisconsin, even if these firms are all owned by
U.S. individuals.  However, it is these tax policy choices (along with
the choice of tax rate) that are important for government sovereignty.
If it were not for varying tax policy preferences—if the demarcation of
the corporate income tax base is merely a matter of the implementa-
tion of general income tax norms (which may still differ substantially
from management and financial accounting norms)—then it is not
clear why most countries would not adopt some generally accepted
income tax principles analogous to the GAAP or IAS.79  In other
words, if we can imagine governments giving up source-based business
taxation,80 then we can imagine variations in business taxation among
different countries substantially disappearing.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine governments giving up the
goal of using business tax policy to affect business operations in their
own countries.  Suppose, for example, that among all companies that
are owned by U.S. individuals, the vast majority (in terms of number
as well as of revenue, assets, and employment) operate in the United
States.  Then U.S. lawmakers, in designing U.S. tax law under an
RBFA framework, might have strong reasons to define the corporate
income tax base in ways that promote domestic economic policy
objectives.  In this case, tax policy, and therefore tax law, might con-
tinue to differ substantially across countries.  RBFA design has vari-
ous choices in dealing with this problem.  One is to require firms to
determine their tax base according to the different laws of the main
shareholder-residence countries (for example, any country with share-
holder ownership of 10% or more).  Another is to require firms to
determine their tax base only according to the laws of the largest
shareholder-residence countries:  For example, either the law of the
majority shareholder-residence country applies, or, if there was no
majority shareholder country, some international standard for apply-
ing income tax principles would be used.
These different options trade compliance costs against other policy
objectives.  More importantly, they would lead to inter-investor exter-
nalities:  Investors’ tax burdens would depend on where other inves-
tors come from.  Inter-shareholder externalities created by rate
differentials pose the most serious feasibility challenge for RBFA de-
79 Both Green, note 18, and Giovannini & Hines, note 16, are inclined to assume a R
single set of rules when corporate income is taxed in different resident countries.  The
discussion here provides a justification for such assumption.
80 It seems implausible to assume that they would give up the very aim of attracting
mobile business factors, through whatever means.
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sign.81  Inter-shareholder externalities created by tax base differences
can be seen a different form of the same challenge.
D. Why Would Firms Comply at All?
A third, obvious, and basic question for RBFA, which may strike
many readers as being the most fundamental, is why firms would even
try to fulfill compliance obligations imposed by ultimate investor
countries.  Why would a U.S. company operating entirely in the
United States have an incentive to pay corporate tax to governments
in Canada, Europe, or Asia?  These governments cannot directly audit
or enforce tax liabilities of a U.S. company without operating in the
United States.  They may not even know of the existence of the com-
pany.  If audits and enforcement in foreign countries are conditions of
the feasibility of RBFA, then perhaps we should conclude that RBFA
is infeasible.
There are at least two reasons for suspending disbelief here, one
having to do with intergovernmental cooperation and the other with
market forces for compliance.
1. Treaty-Based Mutual Administrative Assistance
To begin, many firms have both foreign and domestic ultimate indi-
vidual ownership.  Therefore, tax authorities in the countries where
these firms operate should have largely the same reasons to audit the
firms under RBFA as they do today—the audits would generate do-
mestic tax revenue.82
Moreover, it is natural to imagine the adoption of RBFA (if it were
otherwise feasible), or indeed of any exclusively individual-residence-
based corporate taxation (such as shareholder attribution), to proceed
through treaty negotiations.  Since only corporate income tax reform
is at issue, the international tax framework for individual taxation pre-
sumably would remain, where both source and residence taxation
were still contemplated.  One would thus expect the system of bilat-
eral tax treaties to remain.  The contracting states would surrender
source country taxing rights over corporate income in exchange for
individual residence-based taxing rights.  In other words, the replace-
ment of source-based by individual residence-based corporate taxa-
tion would happen only on a reciprocal basis:  One contracting state
would give up its source-based taxing rights over corporate income
81 See Part IV.
82 Conversely, it is likely that even today, the audit rate for wholly-foreign-owned U.S.
corporations is lower than the average audit rate for U.S. corporations.
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only conditional on the other contracting state giving up similar
rights.83
This exchange may itself be conditioned on a greater extent of mu-
tual assistance in (corporate tax) enforcement than is practiced under
tax treaty frameworks today.  It seems that such enhanced mutual as-
sistance can only be expected if the fundamental norms of interna-
tional taxation are to change.84  To assess the possibility of such
mutual assistance, I believe it is important to recognize two points.
First, mutual administrative assistance is a much weaker form of gov-
ernment reciprocity than the clearing house system of inter-national
revenue transfer described in Giovannini and Hines (and actually
practiced for some purposes among E.U. member countries).85  It re-
quires governments not to collect taxes for one another but only to
devote some audit resources on one another’s behalf.
Second, I believe it is difficult to over-emphasize how much interna-
tional legal norms have changed regarding the degree of acceptable
mutual assistance in tax collection during the last few years.  The
OECD’s Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assis-
tance in Tax Matters now has 113 participating jurisdictions,86 and
supports two separate and comprehensive regimes for the automatic
exchange of information:  the Multilateral Competent Authority
Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports,87 and
the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Ex-
change of Financial Account Information (pursuant to the Common
Reporting Standard).88  This has been possible, of course, not because
states have suddenly become very altruistic or better resourced in
their enforcement apparatuses.  Instead, it is because much of the ad-
ministrative burden of these regimes are shouldered by and large by
83 In addition, the incomplete adoption of RBFA might leave some portion of the cor-
porate tax base still subject to source taxation.  Suppose pension funds from Canada and
China jointly invest in a U.S. firm.  Suppose Canada and the United States enter into a new
treaty reciprocally adopting RBFA (or shareholder attribution) for taxing corporate in-
come, but China and the United States do not enter into such a treaty.  The U.S. firm
jointly owned by Chinese and Canadian investors would continue to pay source-based tax
to the United States on the portion of its income attributable to Chinese investors.
84 Under an exclusively residence-based corporate tax system, the enforcement assis-
tance of source countries might nonetheless be required.  See Green, note 18, at 72-73. R
85 See text accompanying notes 49-52. R
86 OECD, Jurisdictions Participating in The Convention On Mutual Administrative As-
sistance in Tax Matters (Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-informa-
tion/Status_of_convention.pdf.
87 OECD, Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-
by-Country Reports (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/about-
automatic-exchange/CbC-MCAA-Signatories.pdf.
88 OECD, Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Auto-
matic Exchange of Financial Account Information (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.oecd.org/
tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/MCAA-Signatories.pdf.
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private parties:  Mutual assistance only requires two states to enable
their own subjects to comply with the requests of the other state.  In
this context of monumental changes in international legal norms, it
seems difficult to draw a line between government enforcement ef-
forts focused on ensuring that information is properly collected pursu-
ant to exchange of information agreements and those that feature
audits.89
2. Market Forces
The real world experiment that is the implementation of FATCA
has shown how much a powerful source country can do to marshal
market forces to elicit compliance from foreign firms.  Although the
blunt compliance device of FATCA is to subject noncompliant finan-
cial institutions to FATCA withholding, FATCA has achieved as much
success as it has mainly because the threat of withholding triggered
extensive market forces:  If financial institutions want to have custom-
ers—which they can do only by preserving exposure to U.S. invest-
ments—they had better comply with FATCA.  Better FATCA-
readiness meant better access to economic rent from providing global
financial services; conversely, worse FATCA-readiness meant the risk
of being excluded from earning such economic rent.  Indeed, the large
number of tax haven countries that rushed to enter into IGAs with the
United States suggests that both countries and firms compete to offer
compliance, if economic rent can be earned in return.
Thus in some ways still not well understood, FATCA withholding
has become an example of the type of optimal sanctions discussed in
textbooks:  It serves a deterrence function without ever having to be
applied.  It is natural to conjecture that the United States and other
OECD countries, as dominant locations of investor residence, can lev-
erage the same kind of power in steering major market players to-
wards compliance with individual-residence-based corporate taxation,
including RBFA.
IV. THE INFEASIBILITY OF RBFA
Legal jurisdiction, the possibility of enforcement, compliance costs,
as well as the accounting complexities of integrating corporate-  and
shareholder-level taxation, have in the past been presented as the
main feasibility obstacles in the way of exclusively individual resi-
89 It may even be difficult to draw a line between audits and collection.  If this is the
case, then the only legal norm that constitutes an obstacle to one government collecting
revenue on behalf of another is revenue transfer between countries—and we know that
even this norm may not be absolute, based on experience in the European Union.
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dence-based corporate taxation.90  The question is whether RBFA can
be designed so as to mitigate some of these concerns without trigger-
ing worse problems.  While the last Part surveyed considerations that
are generally favorable to RBFA, I now highlight one potentially det-
rimental problem.
Suppose that Company X is owned ultimately in equal proportion
by investors from Countries A, B, C, and D, which have RBFA corpo-
rate tax rates of 10%, 20%, 30% and 40%, respectively.  After appor-
tioning $100 of income (based on generally accepted income tax
principles) equally to the four countries, Company X makes payments
to the countries in the amount of $2.50, $5, $7.50, and $10, respec-
tively. Company X will have $75 left for distribution.  The average
effective tax rate of 25% is determined by the composition of ultimate
shareholders and their respective countries’ tax rates, and not by deci-
sions about where to locate production or profits made by corporate
managers.  The corporation’s investment decisions, therefore, may be
undistorted by corporate taxes.
Shareholders’ behavior, however, might be distorted.  If Company
X made pro rata distributions to its shareholders, then the 25% aver-
age rate would affect the after-tax returns of all investors.  This clearly
would be to the detriment of investors from Countries A and B, and to
the benefit of investors from Countries C and D.  Unless shareholders
knew who the other ultimate shareholders were (and could predict
how ownership patterns might change), they would not be able to pro-
ject their investment returns.91  But the choice to impose corporate-
level taxation as opposed to shareholder-level taxation tends to be jus-
tified precisely when ownership may change and shareholders are not
in privity with one other.  Therefore, unpredictable shareholder
changes represent the most relevant scenario for RBFA to consider.
The imposition of the RBFA, however, seems to make equity financ-
ing impossible to price in such a scenario.
Could Company X make non-pro rata distributions to shareholder
pools from different countries?  This would neutralize the inter-share-
holder tax externality.  But this solution seems unavailable for two
reasons.  First, most firms do not make regular distributions of all re-
tained earnings; therefore, in between distributions, shareholder pat-
terns might easily change.  It does not seem generally possible to use
non-pro rata distributions to match, on the one hand, the apportion-
ment of corporate income to different shareholder-residence countries
90 See Green, note 18, at 70-74; Auerbach et al., note 19, at 880-81. R
91 If shareholder composition can be relatively accurately predicted, then high-tax coun-
try investors may be required to pay premia for their equity investments and low-tax coun-
try investors would require discounts.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TAX\71-3\TAX304.txt unknown Seq: 28 31-AUG-18 13:50
578 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:
(in one period) with, on the other, the distributions to shareholders
from these countries (in possibly another period).  For instance, sup-
pose that Company X made formulary apportionment in Year 1 ac-
cording to that year’s ownership pattern; made formulary
apportionment in Year 2 according to a different ownership pattern in
Year 2, and made a distribution in Year 3 when owned by yet a third
pattern of owners.  The question is in what ways the distribution could
be made, non-pro rata, to register the fact that it comes (perhaps only
in part) out of Year 1 and Year 2 retained earnings, each subject to a
different RBFA formula.  I do not see an answer to this question.
Second, non-pro rata distributions based on ultimate shareholder
residence would effectively create different classes of shares, even
within what by corporate law would be a single class of shares (or
even a single share).  It would thus seem to require accommodation
from the corporate laws of different countries, and would no longer be
just a matter of tax compliance.  In all, therefore, unless RBFA can be
designed to allow pro rata distributions without generating destabi-
lizing externalities among shareholders, it does not seem to be an ac-
ceptable form of residence-based taxation.
This (rather nasty looking) problem does not arise for other types
of exclusively individual residence-based tax systems.  Consider first a
system where corporate income is allocated to ultimate shareholders,
and countries of individual residence simply tax this phantom income.
Because no tax would  be imposed at the entity level, pro rata distri-
butions pose no problems, and there would be no more intra-share-
holder externalities than exist under the current corporate income tax.
Alternatively, under the Giovannini-Hines model, a uniform tax of
50% would be imposed at the corporate level, and differences in resi-
dence country tax rates would be reflected by residence country re-
funds.92  This again is consistent with pro rata distributions.
If RBFA is infeasible, the project of taxing corporate income by
reference to individual shareholder residence will need to revert to
shareholder-level tax instruments.93  As discussed in Part II, some
scholars have suggested that this can be done through the flow-
through taxation of corporations, through accrual accounting (for ex-
ample through mark-to-market) of individual income, or through a
combination of both.  An obvious question for such suggestions is why
we have not simply changed the topic:  Have we not simply aban-
doned corporate taxation and decided to deal with the problem of
deferral through other methods of individual income taxation?  Alter-
92 See Giovannini & Hines, note 16, at 194. R
93 Or revisit proposals to define corporate residence by shareholder residence.  See
Fleming et al., note 21, at 1693. R
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TAX\71-3\TAX304.txt unknown Seq: 29 31-AUG-18 13:50
2018] RESIDENCE-BASED FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT 579
natively, the shareholder attribution approach to corporate taxation
can be seen as an administrative variant of the corporate tax distinct
from individual taxation.  Yet, as long as tax liabilities are pinned to
individuals, it may always seem artificial to maintain that the tax is
imposed on entities instead.  Many may find the task of making such
an artificial looking tax feasible unappealing.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The challenge RBFA faces in dealing with inter-shareholder exter-
nalities may be viewed as a rude reminder of how problematic it is, in
tax design, to pursue neutrality with respect to just one set of decisions
by one set of actors (for example corporate managers’ decisions in
maximizing after-tax returns).  Arguably, depicting the problem of in-
ternational corporate taxation as one of finding relatively immobile
factors by reference to which to tax corporate income (or rent) simply
invites one to commit this kind of error.  As discussed in Section II.A,
this formulation of the problem of international corporate taxation is
one of the fundamental themes in discussions of the DBCFT.  While it
is unclear how many scholars have accepted the formulation, not
many have disputed its appeal, either.94
I believe that in the extant literature, only two types of tax design
can strictly be seen as responding to this conception of the problem of
international taxation.  The first is exclusively individual-shareholder-
residence-based corporate taxation, including both RBFA and share-
holder attribution. Neither of these two options has so far received
much attention, especially compared to other reform proposals for
shareholder-level taxation that has an international dimension, for ex-
ample, shareholder accrual or mark-to-market (of the Toder-Viard va-
riety95) or pass-through taxation.  However, whether these latter types
of shareholder-level taxation are best understood as ways of re-
forming corporate taxation, in the sense DBCFT proponents intend, is
debatable.
A second type of tax design that responds to the problem of taxing
corporate income by reference to immobile factors is formulary ap-
portionment by reference to the location of final consumers.96  I have
previously argued that final consumer-based formulary apportion-
ment is most likely infeasible, because the identities of buyers are not
generally transmitted through market transactions in goods and ser-
94 See Section II.A for further discussion of this problem.
95 See Toder & Viard, note 17, at 702. R
96 See Avi-Yonah et al., note 26, at 517-18; Devereux & de la Feria, note 26, at 3-4. R
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vices.97  Others, however, may continue to pursue this type of tax de-
sign.  Indeed, as Oosterhuis and Parsons’ contribution to this
symposium shows, some might simply see it as a way of extending/
revising source-based taxation.98  Whatever the short-term pragmatic
merits of this approach are for the United States, I find it interesting
in two respects.  The first is that while proponents of “destination-
based” taxation often denounce the very concept of source, it is clear
that others see the source concept as sufficiently malleable as to be
able to incorporate intuitions about “destination”.99  The second is
that, other than a narrow and contextual conception of neutrality, not
much has been offered by way of a normative justification for con-
sumption-based allocation of taxing rights over corporate profits.
Countries are awakening to the attraction of such allocation mostly
because, as a matter of administration and of legal norms, they can.
Therefore, taxation by virtue of consumer location is likely to come
about not because of its superior efficiency or other normative proper-
ties, but simply by force majeure.  This, of course, has long been sus-
pected to be the logic of source-based taxation.100
What about the destination-based cash flow tax itself?  It may be
useful to repeat here a distinction I make elsewhere. There are two
clearly distinct senses of taxing corporate profit by reference to final
consumer location.101  The first is to tax corporate profit in the loca-
tion where the sales to final consumers generating such profit are
made.  This is a type of formulary apportionment.  The second is to
tax corporate profit in the location where the owners of the profit use
the profit for consumption.  This is what the DBCFT (aka the border
adjustment tax) does.  In other words, the DBCFT taxes corporate
profit not where the customers of profit-making corporations are, but
where the owners of such profit reside—not surprisingly, that is also
where they consume.102  The DBCFT, therefore, has the effect of indi-
vidual residence-based taxation of consumption (and as a consump-
tion tax, it is no longer concerned with the problem of deferral).
Therefore, it is misleading to say that the DBCFT implements a new
way (that is not based on source or residence) of allocating the taxing
right over corporate profit.
97 Cui, note 29, at 342-44.  It is also not clear that such apportionment is normatively R
attractive.  Id. at 319-21.
98 Oosterhuis & Parsons, note 68. R
99 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah et al., note 26, at 509-10; Scho¨n, note 1, at 429-30; Auerbach et R
al., note 3, at 6-8; Devereux & de la Feria, note 26, at 3-4. R
100 Cui, note 7, at 262-63. R
101 These correspond, respectively, to what I called Version 1 and Version 2 of the desti-
nation-based cash flow tax.  See Cui, note 29, at 304-05. R
102 The DBCFT is to personal taxation of consumption financed out of corporate rent
what the VAT is to personal consumption taxation.
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Overall, then, the conceptual heuristic of taxing corporate income
by reference to immobile factors seems to have yielded no findings.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article makes the following four contributions to the current
debate about the structure of international corporate income taxation.
First, I offer a new taxonomy of different ways of taxing corporate
income by reference to individual shareholders, and distinguish what I
call the “shareholder-attribution” approach from integration, pass-
through, and other approaches.  Second, I argue that although tradi-
tional international legal norms had led international tax design to
avoid taxing foreign corporations “unconnected” with the taxing juris-
diction (for example, foreign corporations earning only foreign in-
come), these legal norms have gone through substantial
transformations in recent years.  The exercise of jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations has vastly expanded in the sphere of international
taxation, as has the extent of mutual assistance in tax collection.  Con-
sequently, the choice between taxing foreign corporations and taxing
shareholders should be made mainly on administrative (including en-
forceability) grounds other than international legal norms.
Third, against this new landscape of international tax law, I com-
pare the relative administrative advantages of two forms of tax design
that implement exclusively individual-shareholder-residence-based
taxation of corporate income:  the shareholder-attribution approach,
and RBFA.  I conclude that while otherwise promising, RBFA is in-
feasible because it is incompatible with most corporations’ need to
make pro rata distributions.
Fourth and finally, some economists have recently formulated the
challenge of international corporate taxation as one of taxing corpo-
rate income or profit by reference to immobile factors.  I argue that
exclusively individual-shareholder-residence-based taxation of corpo-
rate income is among the few types of tax design that directly address
this challenge, but the difficulties all of them face suggest that this
formulation has not proven particularly helpful.
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